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JOHN HEMPHILL-CHIEF JUSTICE OF TEXAS
James P. Hart*

OHN HEMPHILL has sometimes been compared to John Marshall.' Their work was similar, in that each was called on to
lay the foundations of an enduring jurisprudence for a newlyborn government. While the questions decided by Hemphill, as
Chief Justice of Texas, do not approach in breadth and scope the
problems to which Marshall devoted his legal acumen and statesmanship, still from a technical standpoint these questions were
at least equally difficult; and in scholarship, clarity of expression,
logical force, and human sympathy, Hemphill's opinions compare
favorably with those written by any judge.
Hemphill and his associates faced unusual perplexities. Until
1840, all rights in Texas of a civil nature, and thereafter many
important ones, were determined by the civil law of Spain or
Mexico The proper adjudication of these rights required a knowledge of this law, which involved among other things an ability to
understand the Spanish language. Even in the fields where the
common law of England was adopted, modifications were made
by statute that required interpretation in application. Nor was the
environment one which we would regard as conducive to the best
judicial work. Living conditions in Texas generally and particularly in Austin were primitive; there was constant danger from
Indian raids and Mexican invasions. 3 Access to texts and decisions
Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Texas.
69 (1885); DAVENPORT, THE HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS 15 (1917); 8 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 520
(1932); FULMORE, HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF TEXAS AS TOLD IN COUNTY NAMES 200
1 LYNCH, THE BENCH AND BAR OF TEXAS

(1915).
2 Butte, Early Development of Law and Equity in Texas, 26 YALE L. J. 699 (1917);
Phillips, Historical Introduction, 1 TEx. JUR. 1-ii (1929).

3In

the Austin City Gazette for January 15, 1840, p. 2, col. 4, immediately following
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of other courts was limited, even in situations where helpful
precedents might be expected to exist. In such an atmosphere and
under such handicaps, it is truly remarkable that Hemphill and
his colleagues turned out opinions whose general excellence has
probably never been equalled by any other court in Texas history.
Hemphill did not come to Texas until 1838, about two years
after Texas had won her independence. Like his predecessor,
Thomas Jefferson Rusk, and many other leaders in Texas in that
day, Hemphill was a native of South Carolina, where he was
born on December 18, 1803. 4 Both of his parents were of Northern
Irish stock, his mother being a relative of Robert Fulton. Hemphill was educated in the public schools and at Jefferson College,
in Pennsylvania, where he graduated in 1825 second in his class.
After teaching school for several years, he studied law in the office
of D. J. McCord of Columbia. In 1829 he was admitted to practice in the courts of common pleas and in 1831 he was admitted
to practice in the equity courts. In 1836, Hemphill participated in
a military expedition against the Seminoles in Florida, where he
contracted malaria, which apparently permanently impaired his
health.
When he came to Texas, Hemphill settled at Washington on the
the report of the first meeting of the Supreme Court on January 13, appears the following item: "A courier is rumored to have arrived from San Antonio de Bexar an.
nouncing the arrival at that city of a delegation from the Comanches, who have come
in for the purpose of treating with the government for peace. They offer, among other
conditions, to return all the white prisoners in their possession."
For personal recollections of Austin, including a description of Hemphill's residences
and domestic life, see Terrell, The City of Austin /rom 1839 to 1865, 14 QUARTERLY OF
TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 122 (1900).
4 Biographical notes on Hemphill, from which many of the facts stated in this article
have been taken, include the following: 8 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 520
(1932); Gaines, John Hemphill, GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 3 (1908); THRALL, PICTORIAL HISTORY OF TEXAS 551 (1879) ; BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN
CONGRESS 1774-1927, 1085 (1928) ; BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TEXAS 151 (1880);
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE TEXAS CONVENTIONS AND CONGRESSES 99 (1941);
FuLmoRE, HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY or TEXAS AS TOLD IN COUNTY NAMES 200 (1915);
BAKER, TEXAS SCRAP-BooK 300 (1875) ; King, A Biographical Sketch of John Hemphill,
THE DOCKET (San Antonio, Texas), vol. 1, no. 2, p. 1 (June 1896) ; LYNCH, THE
BENCH AND BAR OF TEXAS 69 (1885) ; DAVENPORT, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF TEXAS 15 (1917) ; BROWN, ANNALS OF TRAVIS COUNTY AND THE CITY OF AUSTIN,
Chapter XXII-1862, 43 (no date); MONUMENTS COMMEMORATING THE CENTENARY OF
TEXAS INDEPENDENCE 184 (1938).
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Brazos. Realizing the necessity of learning the Spanish language
so as to understand the Texas law, he is said to have gone into retirement until he mastered Spanish.5 He practiced law at Washington until some date prior to May 3, 1839, and thereafter practiced at Bastrop 6 until January 20, 1840, when he was elected
district judge.7 He had previously declined an offer by President
Lamar to appoint him Secretary of the Treasury.!
We do not have much information about Hemphill's work on
the district bench, except that we know that as exofficio associate
justice of the Supreme Court he participated in one case in which
he joined in a concurring opinion,9 and he wrote two opinions of
the court.10 However, we have accounts of his experiences of a more
exciting nature. While Hemphill was holding court at San Antonio
in 1840, a white girl by the name of Putnam who had been held
captive by the Indians was returned by them, and Hemphill was
in the party that rode with the child to join her relatives near
Gonzales." On March 19, 1840, Hemphill had a part in the Council House fight with the Comanche chiefs at San Antonio. It appears that Hemphill started out merely as a bystander, having
consented that the courtroom might be used for the parley. Violence
soon followed bargaining, however, and Hemphill's roll is thus
described in the official report of Col. McLeod, who was in com12
mand of the Texans:
5 8 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 520 (1932).
6 The Telegraph and Texas Register (Houston, Texas), June 5, 1839, p. 3, col. 2,

reports that John Hemphill was appointed as the chairman of a committee of the Bastrop
bar at a meeting held on May 3, 1839. In the July 3, 1839 issue of the same paper, p. 3,
col. 4, appears the announcement, dated June 15, 1839, of the dissolution of the firm of
Crosby, Hemphill and Raymond at Washington, and an announcement of the formation

of a new firm of John Hemphill and Charles H. Raymond, Hemphill to have his office
at Bastrop and Raymond at Franklin.

7 Gaines, John Hemphill, 4 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 3 (1908).
8 Hemphill's letter, dated March 3, 1839, declining the appointment, is published in
2 PAPERS OF MIRABEAU BUONAPARTE LAMAR 480 (1922).

9 Winfried v. Yates, Dallam 363 (1840).
10 Harvey v. Patterson, Dallam 369 (1840); Allen v Ward, Dalam 371 (1840).
11 BROWN, INDIAN WARS AND PIONERS OF TEXAS 52 (no date).
12 Quoted in BROWN,

INDIAN WARS AND PIONEERS OF TEXAS 76 (no date), and

Gaines, John Hemphill, 4 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 3 (1908). See, also, Huson, District

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

"John Hemphill, then District Judge and afterward so long Chief
Justice, assailed in the council house by a chief and slightly wounded,
felt reluctantly compelled (as he remarked to the writer afterwards) to
disembowel his assailant with his bowie knife, but declared that he did
so under a sense of duty, while he had no personal acquaintance with
nor personal ill-will toward his antagonist."
On December 5, 1840, Chief Justice Rusk resigned and John
Hemphill was elected to succeed him. Hemphill's leading opponent

was James Webb, former Attorney General. The vote in the joint
ballot in Congress was very close, each candidate receiving seven
votes in the Senate and Hemphill gaining 21 votes to 19 for Webb
in the House of Representatives." A contemporary news report
stated that Webb was defeated by the circulation of a false rumor
to the effect that as Attorney General he had approved the claims
of the empresario, Nixon, whereas in fact he had ruled directly to
the contrary. 4 While deploring the defeat of Webb on this
ground, 5 the same correspondent declared that, "Judge Hemphill,
during the period he has resided in the country, has acquired
a high reputation, both for legal acquirements and moral attributes.""6 There is nothing to show that Hemphill had anything
to do with the circulation of the false rumors about Webb. Apparently Hemphill had a high opinion of Webb. Later, when Webb
was serving on the district bench, Hemphill as Chief Justice paid
him the unique compliment of adopting his opinion as District
Judge as the opinion of the Supreme Court. 7
Judges of Relugio County 22 (1941). On May 30, 1840, Hemphill wrote to Judge A. B.
Shelby of the First Judicial District at Houston, requesting his aid in apprehending
cattle thieves, who had stolen cattle from "the President and other gentlemen high in
office in the new Republic of Rio Grande, and were brought through New La Bahia
before the faces and at the defiance as it were of these gentlemen." The letter is published in the Telegraph and Texas Register (Houston, Texas), Oct. 28, 1840, p. 4, col. 2.
13 Telegraph and Texas Register (Houston, Texas), Dec. 16, 1840, p. 1, col. 4.
14 "This mischievous report, which could not be contradicted until after the election,
probably decided the vote against him [Webb]." Ibid.
15 "Such is the fate of elections by joint ballot; passion, prejudice, secret lies, party

spirit and sectional interests are brought to bear against the most unimpeachable characters." Ibid.
18 Ibid.
17 State v. Jones, 18 Tex. 874, 883 (1857).
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Hemphill's reported opinions as Chief Justice of the Republic
are all contained in the single volume of Dallam's Decisions. As
might be expected, a number of these decisions relate to questions
of procedure, which naturally would be more unsettled at the beginning of the court's history than thereafter. Hemphill took occasion to remind the bar that "our system of proceedings in civil
suits differs from that known in England and adopted in most of
the states of the United States."'" In another case he referred to the
"technical distinctions of the system of pleading under the common law" and observed that, "under the simplicity of the system
adopted by the statutes of this republic, they must surely be unknown." 19
He had frequent occasion to use his knowledge of Spanish in
examining texts and codes. He first used Spanish in his opinion
without translating it,20 but in later opinions he followed quotations of the Spanish text with English translations.2 He also
thought it proper to remind counsel that they should search for
authorities in the Spanish or Mexican law, where it controlled,
rather than relying on common law precedents. In Scott v. Maynard,2 - he said:
"Before awarding final judgment, the court will take occasion to

express its sense of the important assistance afforded them by the able
and zealous efforts of the gentlemen of the bar, when their investigations are directed to the system of laws by which the matters in controversy must be decided. But when their arguments are based on some
other system, which, however admirable for its justice or exalted for its
wisdom, can exercise no other authority than that derived from the
force of reason, their labors serve to perplex and confound, rather than
remove the embarrassments which shroud the important principles in-

volved in the controversy. The court appreciates the difficulty arising
18 Fowler v. Poor, Dallam 401,403 (1841).
19 Tinnen v. Matthews, Dallam 491, 492 (1842).

See Mills v. Walker, Dallam 416, 418 (1841).
See Garrett v. Nash, Dallam 497, 499 (1843) and Scott v. Maynard, Dallam 548,
551 (1843).
22Dallam 548, 552 (1843).
20
21
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from the scarcity of books or authorities on questions arising under the
former laws of the country. But it is clearly the duty of the attorneys to
exhaust all which may be accessible to them before they turn for assistance to the common or any other system of law."

It is obvious from Hemphill's opinions that he diligently and
laboriously searched the authorities to ascertain the rule of Spanish law applicable to the case before him, but he was conscious of
the inadequacy of the available sources. In Smith v. Townsend,
he remarked:
"in considering the first objection, we have to regret that the want of
authorities, in relation to the former laws of the country, prevents us
from attaining-on some of the points involved in this case-to conclusions which are altogether satisfactory. Guided, however, by the
feeble and confused lights with which we are furnished, we proceed to
decide this controversy, confining our opinion to the points which must

necessarily be adjudicated."

Hemphill was not left to perform his judicial labors undisturbed. In 1842, General Vasquez invaded Texas from Mexico and
captured San Antonio. The threat to Austin caused its virtual
abandonment as the capital, Congress removing its sessions to
Washington on the Brazos. It was said that only those remained
in Austin who were unable to leave. 4 The business of the Supreme
Court was very dull; in fact, the Court held no sessions from the
end of the January term, 1842, to the beginning of the June term,
1843.25 Hemphill joined General Somervell's expedition to the Rio
Grande, as Adjutant General.2 6 However, the expedition soon was
23 Dallam 569, 570 (1844). See, also, Scott v. Maynard, Dallam 548, 550 (1843):
"Having no access to the works of Febrero, we are compelled to glean such extracts
from that author applicable to this subject, as may be found on examining the reports
of Louisiana."
24 See BROWN, ANNALS OF TRAVIS COUNTY AND THE CITY OF AUSTIN, Chapter IX1842, 9 (no date) : "The streets [of Austin] grew up in weeds and bushes and became
the undisputed haunts of wild animals and such Indians as saw fit to visit them."
25 Gaines, John Hemphill, 4 GR AT AmERICAN LAWYERS 3 (1908). The opinions for
the January term, 1842, end on page 492 of Dallam and the opinions for the June term,
1843, begin on the next page.
26 Telegraph and Texas Register (Houston, Texas), Oct. 26, 1842, p. 3, col. 3, Nov.
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abandoned, and Hemphill and most of the others returned to their
homes, thereby escaping the fate of the Mier prisoners." In the
June term, 1843, we again find him sitting as Chief Justice. 8
In addition to the other handicaps under which he worked,
Hemphill's pay for his judicial work was highly uncertain. In the
29
Texas State Archives, in Hemphill's handwriting, is a memorial
to the Congress, requesting most respectfully that he be paid his
salary as district judge, from March 20 to December 5, 1840, in
the sum of $2125.00, and as Chief Justice from December 5,
1840, to January 3, 1842, in the sum of $3250.00. To show his
urgent need, Hemphill pointed out that he owed "seven hundred
fifty Dollars in par funds," all of which debt having been contracted "since Judicial Office was conferred upon me." Later he
and Judge R. E. B. Baylor joined in a memorial3 in which they
respectfully represented to the Congress that "they have exhausted
their private resources and have to some extent involved themselves in pecuniary liabilities to sustain the Judicial Department
of the Government," and that "under such circumstances it will
be impossible for the undersigned longer to hold the Courts of
the Country unless Congress should adopt some measures for their
relief."
While Hemphill was proposed as a candidate for President in
1843 and 1844, he declined to run because of ill health. Hemp2, 1842, p. 2, col. 5, and Dec. 16, 1842, p. 1, col. 5; Hendricks, The Somervell Expedition
to the Rio Grande, 1842, 23 SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 112, 116 (1919).
27 Hendricks, supra note 26, at 135; Northern Standard (Clarksville, Texas), Feb.
4, 1843, p. 3, col. 1.
28 See opinions beginning Dallam 493 (1843).
29 Memorial, endorsed "No. 37," Texas State Archives. In 1842, Hemphill voluntarily
resigned his place as Chief Justice and was re-elected, in order that the retrenchment
bill, which reduced his salary from 83000 to $1750 per year, could be applicable to him.
Telegraph and Texas Register (Houston, Texas), Feb. 2, 1842, p. 2, col. 2, and Feb. 9,
1842, p. 1, col. 4. The message of President Houston, dated January 22, 1842, stating
that Hemphill's resignation had been received and accepted, is published in 2 THE;
WRITINGS OF SAM HOUSTON 438 (1939).
30 Memorial, endorsed "No. 76," Texas State Archives.
21 King, A Biographical Sketch of John Hemphill, THE Docx r (San Antonio,
Texas), vol. 1, no. 2, p. 1 (June 1896) ; Northern Standard (Clarksville, Texas), May
18, 1843, p. 2, col. 4, Oct. 28, 1843, p. 2, col. 1, Jan. 13, 1844, p. 2, col. 1, and Feb. 24,
1844, p. 2, col. I and p. 3, col. 2.
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hill was an advocate of annexation,82 and when the convention was

convened in Austin on July 4, 1845, to draft the ordinance of
annexation and the constitution for the state, Hemphill, as a delegate from Washington County, 8 was recognized as one of the lead.84
ers. He was appointed chairman of the Judiciary Committee,
which was charged with the responsibility of drawing the judiciary
section of the constitution.
Hemphill's draft of the judiciary section of the constitution
was presented to the convention on July 11, 1845." 6 It provided for
a three-judge Supreme Court, to be appointed by the Governor
with the consent of the Senate. The main features of this draft
were adopted with little debate. Upon some subjects, however,
disagreement arose. One of these was a suggested amendment establishing separate chancery courts. Upon this matter, Hemphill

expressed himself as follows, in a committee report dated August
8, 1845:'
"That the present system of administering justice in the same court,
according to the principles of both law and equity, or either, as the
circumstances of the controversy may demand, has been long established, is well understood, and possesses too many advantages to be
lightly abandoned."

While Hemphill was thoroughly convinced of the wisdom of
applying law and equity in the same court, he unsuccessfully opposed the proposal that jury trials be granted in equity cases. Part
of his observations on this matter were as follows:?"
"I cannot say that I am very much in favor of either chancery or the
common law system. I should much have preferred the civil law to have
continued in force for years to come. But inasmuch as the chancery
32 Hemphill was a member of a corresponding committee of Washington County
citizens supporting annexation. See letter published in Texas National Register (Wash.
ington, Texas), May 22, 1845, p. 4, col. 1.
83 JOURNALS 6F THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1845, 4 (1845).
34

Id. at 17.

35 Id. at

46.

38 Id. at 191.

37 DEBATES

OF THE TEXAS CONVENTION OF 1845,

271 (1846).
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system, together with the common law, has been saddled upon us, the
question is now, whether we shall keep up the chancery system or blend
them together. If we intend to keep it up as it is known to the courts of
England, the United States, and many of the states, and United States
courts will be established here, we should oppose this innovation; for I
do not know any alteration which could be a greater innovation, than
to subject all chancery cases to a trial by jury. It is well known that the
trial by jury has been esteemed as highly in England, whence we derive
it, as in any country in the world. A great deal of blood has been shed to
preserve it; but I have never known or heard that it was ever thought
of, to extend it to cases in equity, admiralty, or the ecclesiastical, what
we call the probate court. It was never supposed that justice or right
could be dispensed in these courts by the trial by jury. All our notions
of the trial by jury and its benefits are drawn from England; yet there
we find, that in courts of equity, admiralty, maritime jurisdiction, or
the ecclesiastical courts, such a thing was never heard of."

Thomas Jefferson Rusk, the chairman of the convention, took
a view contrary to Hemphill's, saying among other things:88
"The arguments which would go against a section of this kind, go
against the right of trial by jury at all. They proceed upon the ground,
that juries are incompetent to discharge the duties submitted to them
by the law. Now, if they are incompetent in cases of equity they are
equally so in suits at law. But is it in accordance with reason, that
twelve men should be less competent to detect fraud, or to determine a
matter of accounts between man and man, than one? And if a man's
case is submitted to the jury before the court, whose duty it is to charge
the law, and the twelve men determine against him, he does not go away
abusing the organs of the law; he comes to the conclusion that he is in
the wrong. Whereas, if one man sits and judges the entire matter, because it is a case in equity, I will venture the assertion, that nine times
out of ten he will go away dissatisfied."
Rusk's views prevailed, the convention adopting a provision for

jury trials in equity cases as well as those at law. 9
Another interesting debate occurred in connection with the sec-

tion providing for the adjudication of disputes by arbitrators. It
88 Id. at 275.
39 Id. at 267 and 275.
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was in the course of this debate that Lemuel D. Evans, later Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court during the Reconstruction
regime, made his famous statement that "the whole contrivance
of courts of judicature is a fraud upon the community." ' While
Hemphill did not agree with Evans' argument, he did agree with
his conclusion that much could be accomplished by arbitration.
After recalling that under the Mexican law a litigant could not
file a suit in court without making a certificate that he had unsuccessfully tried to have the matter settled by arbitration by buenos
hombres, Hemphill remarked:"1
"Even since the introduction of the common law, it has never been supposed that the Legislature was prohibited or restrained from passing
the laws necessary to decide differences by arbitration.... I would like
to have a provision inserted, that the Legislature shall not have the
power to take away the right of arbitration."
Following this debate the convention adopted a provision permitting the Legislature to provide for settlement of disputes by
arbitration "when the parties shall elect that method of trial."'"
Hemphill also took an important part in the debate upon the
provisions of the proposed constitution relating to the property
rights of married persons. He was particularly anxious to preserve the wife's rights under existing Texas law, as distinguished
from the common law."' Among other things, he said :"
"Under the common law, the husband and wife are but one person;
the very being as [or] legal existence of the woman is suspended during
marriage. By our law they are considered distinct persons at least so
far as their estates or property are concerned....
"I anxiously hope that some provision may be adopted by the conven-

tion by which the rights of the wife will be shielded under the immuni.
ties of the constitution. Should our present law be repealed, and the
401 d. at 355.
41
12

41

Id. at 357.
Id. at 355 and 358.
For Hemphill's majority report on this subject, see id.at 504.
594 and 597.

441d. at
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common law have effect, all slaves, money and every other species of
property, lands excepted, which the wife brings with the marriage, or
acquires thereafter, become the sole and absolute property of the husband. The whole may be absorbed in the payment of his debts before
marriage; may be lost in speculations or at the gaming table, may be
wasted and entirely destroyed, or may be given away in the presence
of his deserted and beggared wife. to the most unworthy wretches, with
the most complete impunity, without responsibility and without impeditnent interposed, or remedy afforded by law."''

After the admission of Texas to the Union, Hemphill was appointed on March 2, 1846, Chief Justice of the State Supreme
Court, and was confirmed unanimously by the Senate. His associates, Abner S. Lipscomb and Royall T. Wheeler, had five and
six votes respectively cast against their confirmation, which is said
by Governor Lubbock to have arisen "from their connection with
certain old land claims." 4
Hemphill served as Chief Justice of the State for over eleven
years, from 1846 until he was elected to the United States Senate
in 1857, his opinions appearing in the first twenty-one volumes of
the Texas Reports. The number of his opinions and the variety of
the questions discussed in them47 make it impossible here to do
4', Compare Hemphill's statement in Wiley & Co. v. Prince, 21 Tex. 637, 639 (1858);
"This is one of the numerous instances in which the folly, fraud or violence of husbands,
and the rapacity of creditors, have extorted from the wife a mortgage of her property to
secure the debts and speculations of the husband."
1s LUBBOCK, Six DECADES IN TEXAS 224 (1900).
4- A partial list of the subjects involved in Hemphill's opinions, with sample cases,
will indicate their diversity: appellate procedure, Harvey v. Patterson, Dallam 370
(1840); gambling contracts, Dunman v. Strather, 1 Tex. 89 (1846) ; admiralty, Brig
Veruna v. Clark, 1 Tex. 30 (1846) ; arbitration, Edrington v. League, 1 Tex. 64 (1846) ;
executors and administrators, Ansley v. Baker, 14 Tex. 607 (1855) ; state's liability to
suit, Board of Land Commissioners v. Walling, Dallam 524 (1843) ; construction of
Mexican colonization statutes, Heirs of Holliman v. Peebles, 1 Tex. 673 (1847) ; statute
of limitations, Judd v. Sampson & Co., 13 Tex. 19 (1854) ; divorce, Wright v. Wright,
3 Tex. 168 (1848), 6 Tex. 3 (1851), id. 29 (1851) ; community and separate property,
Scott v. Maynard, Dallam 548 (1843); rights of putative wife under Spanish law, Lee
v. Smith, 18 Tex. 142 (1856) ; fideicomiso under Mexican law, Gortorio v. Cantu, 7 Tex.
35 (.1851.); Spanish law of contracts in solido, Hall v. Alcorn, Dallam 433 (1841);
homesteads, Pryor v. Stone, 19 Tex. 371 (1857) ; notary's certificate, Hartley v. Frosh,
6 Tex. 208 (1851) ; criminal procedure, State v. Daugherty, 5 Tex. 1 (1849) ; exemplary damages, Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266 (1851) ; domicile, Hare v. Hare, 10 Tex. 355
(1853) ; presumption of validity of marriage, Lockhart v. White, 18 Tex. 102 (1856) ;
property rights in slaves, Nations v. Jones, 20 Tex. 300 (1857) ; common carriers,
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more than make certain general observations about his work and
to refer to some of his opinions dealing with out-of-the-ordinary
questions.
In form, Hemphill's opinions are dignified, direct, learned,
closely reasoned, and carefully written.4" Perhaps the most striking feature of his opinions to the present-day reader is his partiality to the civil law as distinguished from the common law.
Hemphill repeatedly made this plain. For example, in Giddens v.
Byers' Heirs,4 9 Hemphill referred to what he considered a hypertechnical distinction as having "no effect anywhere except in the
hard, naked regions of the Common Law." Referring to the common law procedure, he observed in Neyland v. Neyland ° that "at
Common Law the plaintiff and defendant are placed on the same
footing of knowledge, or rather ignorance, by the pleadings." On
the other hand, he spoke of the "strict equity which characterizes
the Spanish jurisprudence";" and speaking of the two systems
of law he said in Means v. Robinson:5
"An investigation into, and a comparison of, the rules which pervade
both systems, is not necessary to the decision of this case, although such
collation would be wanting neither in interest nor instruction. One fact
Chevallier v. Straham, 2 Tex. 115 (1847) ; ex post facto laws, De Cordova v. City of
Galveston, 4 Tex. 470 (1848) ; proof of foreign laws, Martin v. Payne, 11 Tex. 292
(1854) ; mandamus, Bracken v. Wells, 3 Tex. 88 (1848) ; forced heirs, Parker v. Parker,
10 Tex. 83 (1853) ; riparian water rights, Haas v. Choussard, 17 Tex. 588 (1856);
parole evidence, Mead v. Randolph, 8 Tex. 191 (1852) ; habeas corpus, Ex parte Thornton, 9 Tex. 635 (1853) ; prohibition, Browne v. Rowe, 10 Tex. 183 (1853) ; annulment
of marriage, Robertson v. Cole, 12 Tex. 356 (1854).
4s Hemphill rarely indulged in humor in his opinions, but occasionally he did so.
See Norris v. Banta, 21 Tex. 427 (1858). His style of writing is ordinarily simple, but
he could employ unusual words with good effect, as in State v. Daugherty, 5 Tex. 1, 4
(1849) : "It will not be necessary to attempt to eviscerate from these really or apparently conflicting decisions the true rule of construction." He was frank in his statements, as in Hartwell v. Jackson, 7 Tex. 576, 577 (1852): "This record presents a
tangled maze of anomalous proceedings, in the narrative of which no regard is had for
their chronological order," and in Western v. Woods, 1 Tex. 1, 7 (1846) : "We can not
permit the imperfect and slovenly entry of the decree in this cause to pass without
observation and reprehension."
49

12 Tex. 75, 83 (1854).

5019 Tex. 423, 429 (1857).
51Saunders v. Eilson, 19 Tex. 194, 199 (1857).
527

Tex. 502, 510 (1851).
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would be abundantly evident on such inquiry, viz: that the rules of the
Spanish Monarch, whether we consider the sound philosophy on which
they are founded, or their intrinsic equity, would, to say the very least,
not suffer in comparison with those which in the Common Law are
sanctioned by judicial wisdom and authority."
Hemphill emphasized the abandonment of the common law
pleadings in civil cases. In Holman v. Criswell,53 he said:
"The rules of pleadings as found in Chitty, and other elementary treatises, and as recognized in the decisions of Law Courts, have no conclusive authority in our system of procedure. Any allegations which would
show with reasonable certainty the cause of action or ground of defense,
will be sufficient, without reference to conformity with or departure
from the rules of pleading as recognized at Common Law."

On the other hand, Hemphill deplored the retention of the
common law rules of procedure in criminal cases. In prefacing his
remarks in State v. Odum,"' where the question was the sufficiency

of the indictment for theft against the attack that it failed to state
that a bolt of domestic was a chattel, Hemphill said:
"The spirit of reform which has pervaded our civil system of procedure, has not as yet reached our criminal pleading. Its excrescences
still deform our jurisprudence; and I will proceed to consider, whether,
under this ancient system, such as it is, the judgment under revision can
be sustained."

Referring to the claim that the indictment did not sufficiently
enable the court or the defendant to understand the offense charged,
Hemphill said:
"To impute such incapacity to a Court, would be highly indecorous;
and it could not exist in the defendant, without an imbecility which
would render him, legally, incapable of crime."

In matters of the property rights of married persons, it is ob58 15 Tex. 394, 397 (1855).
54 11 Tex. 12, 13 (1853).
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vious that Hemphill was proud of the rights accorded under Texas

law to the wife. In Wood v. Wheeler,55 he said:

"Husband and wife are not one under our laws. The existence of a wife
is not merged in that of the husband. Most certainly is this true, so far
as the rights of property are concerned; they are distinct persons as to
their estates. When property is in question, he is not a baron, nor is she
covert; if by the former is meant a lord or master, and by the latter a
dependent creature, under protection or influence. They are co-equals
in life; and at death the survivor, whether husband or wife, remains the
head of the family."

On the other hand, Hemphill was scathing in his comments on
the rights of married women under the common law. In Jones v.

Taylor,56 he said:
"The doctrine of the incapacity of the leme covert, as it exists at Common Law, can claim such merit as, even in error and wrong, may be
attributable to systematic consistency and uniformity. If it be irrational and barbarous, it harmonizes and is in consonance with, and is
the result of, rules equally unreasonable and equally tinged with the
reading of the dark ages."

Hemphill's admiration for the civil law apparently grew out

of a close study of it. 7 His familiarity with the Spanish and Mexican sources is evident in a variety of situations.5" ie frequently
55 7 Tex. 13, 19 (1851).
, 7 Tex. 240, 246 (1851).
67 Hemphill's characteristic thoroughness is indicated by his statement in White v.
Gay's Executors, 1 Tex. 384, 388 (1847) : "I have hereby alluded to these doctrines of
the common Roman, French, and Louisiana laws, without intending to engage in their
discussion or to derive any assistance from them in the determination of this case; nor
is there any absolute necessity for the recurrence to the reason or principles of foreign
laws for the solution of the questions growing out of this contract, as the provisions of
the laws of Spain relative to such contracts, being full and distinct and embracing all
the circumstances of the transaction, must control the action of the court."
58 Rights under the Mexican and Spanish colonization laws were of great importance
because of the fact that many land titles were established under these laws. This subject
is discussed with great learning and thoroughness by Hemphill in a number of cases,
including particularly Heirs of Holliman v. Peebles, 1 Tex. 673 (1847) ; Houston, President, v. Robertson's Adm'r, 2 Tex. 1 (1847) ; Houston, President, v. Perry, Executor of
Stephen F. Austin, Deceased, 2 Tex. 37 (1847) ; Yates v. Iams, 10 Tex. 168 (1853) ;
Hamilton v. Menifee, 11 Tex. 718 (1854); Donaldson v. Dodd, 12 Tex. 380 (1854);
Edwards v. Beavers, 19 Tex. 506 (1857). The extent of the recognition of Spanish and
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quoted Spanish texts at length, when they were available, and expressed regret that his researches were limited by the lack of a
complete library- For example, in Smith v. Smith,6 he said:
"It should be remembered that we are in a great measure destitute of
authentic collections of the former laws of the country.
"The edition of the Partidas that is in common use is very incomplete,
and we are altogether without the compilations of the laws introduced

since the adoption of that code."

In matters where the common law controlled, he likewise expressed regret that most of the decisions of the courts of other
states in the Union were inaccessible. For example, in State v.
Williams,6 ' Hemphill says:
"The volumes containing full reports of these decisions are not before
me; the substance can be
6 gleaned only from such digests as are within
the reach of the court." '
Hemphill frequently also regretted that the pressure of many
cases prevented his writing his opinions as carefully as he would
have liked. In Cartwright v. Hollis, 2 he comments that "the sub-

ject is by no means exhausted, and requires more extended investigation than the pressure of other cases now permits," and again
in Hamilton v. Menifee,'8 "The case presents several questions of
importance. The want of time, however, forbids the discussion of
any but the most essential.'
Mexican land titles after the Texas Revolution is discussed in Trimble and Murphree
v. Smithers' Adm'r, 1 Tex. 790 (1847). Other examples of the discussion of the civil
law are: the rights of a putative wife, Smith v. Smith, 1 Tex. 621 (1847) ; Lee v. Smith,
18 Tex. 142 (1856) ; right of married women to sue, McIntire v. Chappell, 2 Tex. 378
(1847) ; the rights of inheritance of a widow who marries within one year after her
husband's death, Garrett v. Nash, Dallam 498 (1843) ; the right of parents to inherit
from their child, Reese v. Hicks, 13 Tex. 162 (1854) ; forced heirs, Parker v. Parker, 10
Tex. 83 (1853) Crain v. Crain, 17 Tex. 80 (1856), 21 Tex. 790 (1858) ; the construction and effect of a composition grant, Trevino v. Fernandez, 13 Tex. 630 (1855).
59 1 Tex. 621,628 (1847).
60 8 Tex. 384, 386 (1852).
61 See, also, Emmons v. Oldham, 12 Tex. 18, 26 (1854); Porter v. Miller, 7 Tex.
468, 473 (1852) ; State v.Williams' Executors, 8 Tex. 384, 386 (1852).
62 5 Tex. 152, 170 (1849).
68 11 Tex. 718, 742 (1854).
See, also, Womack,Adm'r, v.Womack, 8 Tex. 397, 413 (1852).
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Hemphill and his associates were generally in accord. Only
occasionally did Hemphill write special concurring opinions, and
a search of the reports has disclosed no case in which Hemphill
dissented from the court's judgment. The method of the handling
of cases by the court at that time, as reported by a source appar65
ently reliable, is of interest:
"In the trial of a cause Judge Hemphill preferred submission by brief
to oral argument, though he did not attempt to control counsel in their
choice and always gave them the closest attention. In the consultation
room there was no discussion, each justice announced the conclusion at
which he had arrived, and, in case of disagreement, the matter was recommitted for further examination. Upon the concurrent agreement as
to decision in any case, it was given to the justice to whom had been
assigned the record therein, and he wrote the opinion of the court in
his own way and assigned therefor his own reasons. The responsibility
of the court was thus limited to the decision agreed on and was in no
way committed to the views or arguments presented in its support.
After Judge Hemphill left the bench this rule was changed."

In 1857, the matter of the election of a United States Senator
in the place of Sam Houston came up before the Legislature. Houston was shelved by the Democrats, because in the Senate he had
opposed the party policies.66 John Hemphill was proposed as one
of the candidates.67 It is difficult to understand why Hemphill
would have wanted to exchange his judicial career, for which
he was so well suited, for the rough-and-tumble life of the Senate,
except that he felt that duty compelled him to do so. At any rate,
65 King, A Biographical Sketch of John Hemphill, THE DOCKET (San Antonio,
Texas), vol. 1, no. 2, p. 5 (June 1896). The statement that the concurrence of the mem.
bers of the court was only in the result reached seems incorrect in view of the fact that
Hemphill wrote several separate concurring opinions, where he disagreed with the reasons given in the main opinion. See Ward v. Boon, Dallam 561, 563 (1844) ; McCullen
v. Guest, 6 Tex. 275, 284 (1851) ; Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457, 476 (1851) ; Hancock
v. McKinney, 7 Tex. 384, 459 (1851) ; Titus v. Kimbro, 8 Tex. 210, 218 (1852) ; Miller
v. Miller, 10 Tex. 319, 334 (1853).
66 LUBBOcK, Six DECADES IN TEXAS 224 (1900) ; JOHNSON AND BARKER, A HtsToRY
OF TEXAS AND TEXANS 524 (1914) ; 0. M. Roberts in 2 WOOTEN, A COMPREHFSIV E
HISTORY OF TEXAS 41, 48 (1898).
67 The Standard (Clarksville, Texas), Sept. 26, 1857, p. 2, col. 1, and Oct. 17, 1857,
p. I, col. 7.
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Hemphill was elected over a field of several prominent opponents
on November 9, 1857."'
Hemphill's election was generally approved;69 but Hemphill,
like other public officials, had his enemies and detractors. One of
the defeated candidates was Anson Jones, last president of the
Republic, a doctor by profession, and a bitter enemy of Hemphill, who wrote thus about the senatorial election and Hemphill

to Oliver Jones, his cousin, on November 23, 1857:70
"The result of the election for U. S. Senators was about what I expected,
and what might reasonably enough have been calculated upon from a
Legislature composed, as ours is, of lawyers--some sixty or seventy of
whom, having various private expectations of their own, were able to
control the matter entirely. The election of Hemphill'appears to have
given the country 'a chill,' or, at least, to have been received very coldly
and the general expression, (so far as I have heard it) is that in his
selection we have lost all, or more than all the advantages we gained by
our triumph in August. In either instance, the only jubilant parties over
the result are the South Carolina fire-eaters and nullifiers, the filibusters, the bogus JacksonDemocrats, with the disaffected ones, and the
K. N.'s generally, with Gen. Houston in particular, who has been laboring hard for Hemphill since February, 1851, and moderately since
1841. The worst feature of Know-Nothingism has achieved a victory,
i. e., the proscription, not of 'foreigners and Catholics,' but of native
citizens, men who happened, half a century ago or more, to have been
born North of Virginia."

We can only conjecture as to whether Hemphill was happy in
his work in the United States Senate. It certainly was not a happy
time for the South, which was faced with the choice of Northern
domination or secession. Most of Hemphill's time seems to have
been taken up with routine matters. However, when it became
(5 The Standard (Clarksville, Texas), Nov. 28, 1857, p. 2, col. 5.
61 Ibid.
70 JONES, MEMORANDA

OF TEXAS,

AND OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO THE REPUBLIC

ITS HISTORY AND ANNEXATION

626 (1859). Jones goes on to attack Hemphill

bitterly because of his personal habits and domestic life. Those wishing to investigate
these matters may consult the papers in Cause No. 3074 in the District Court of Travis
County, entitled Theodora Hemphill v. James Hemphill et al., and No. 2954 in the same
court, entitled R. S. Rust v. F. W. Chandler, Administrator.
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apparent that the Southern states, including Texas, would secede,
Hemphill prepared and delivered in the Senate on January 28,
1861, a learned and eloquent defense of secession, and particularly of Texas's part in it." His speech reads in many parts like
one of his opinions, being well supported by references to and
quotations from historical authorities, such as congressional journals and The Federalist. His speech is undoubtedly one of the
best reasoned expositions of the subject. Turning to Texas's role,
he said:
"I will notice but very briefly the charge of ingratitude against the
State of Texas, should she attempt a separation from the United States.
It must be remembered that the United States did not by the annexation
'
of Texas, propose exclusively or mainly the benefit of the latter. T2

After developing this theme, Hemphill concluded:
"I have spoken to repel assault; but in no captious or querulous spirit.
On the behalf of Texas, I disdain the language of complaint. I vindicate
the truth of history; nothing more.
". Texas will never forget the benefits she derived from the Union.
Texas appreciated the advantages she derived from Mexico, the
immense grants of land, exemption from taxation, the mild administration of her laws. But for causes justified by the world, Texas was impelled to a separation; and now, on grounds deemed essential to her
security and happiness, she will feel herself constrained to dissolve
connection with this Confederacy; fling again her glorious and triumphant banner to the breeze, and establish on a secure basis the rights,
the liberties, and the happiness of her people." '

Hemphill left Washington soon after delivering this speech. 4
He was offered but refused appointment as the Confederate States
district judge for Texas,75 but accepted election as one of the dele71 CONcRFSSIONAL

72 Id. at 595.
,' 3d.

GLOBE,

36th Cong., 2d Seas., 1860-61, Pt. 1, p. 591.

at 596.

7 Chief Justice Gaines, in John Hemphill, 4 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS

3

(1908),

says that Hemphill resigned. The BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN CONCRESS 1774-1927, 1085 (1928) says that he was expelled by a resolution of July 11, 1861.
7' The Standard (Clarksville, Texas), March 30, 1861, p. 2, col. 5, and April 27,
1861, p. 2, col. 5.
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gates to the Confederate Provisional Congress which met at Montgomery in 1861,7' and was a member of the Congress which met
at Richmond later in the same year." He was a candidate for
Confederate States Senator in that year, but was defeated by W.
S. Oldham." However, he was still serving as a member of the
Confederate Congress at Richmond when he died of pneumonia
on January 4, 1862."' His body was brought back to Austin, where
'he was buried on a wet and cold day, on February 10, 1862, in
the State Cemetery. It is said that in spite of the weather "almost
the whole population turned out to do honor to the distinguished
dead." 0
Hemphill's greatness as a judge seems to have been universally
recognized by the profession. In 1869, George W. Paschal, who
had been on the opposite side from Hemphill on the question of
secession, wrote that Hemphill's opinions "evince that of all our
jurists he best understood the sources of our law."'" In 1883,
ex-Chief Justice Roberts, who had served with Hemphill on the
Supreme Court, in presenting a portrait of Hemphill to the Supreme Court, gave a masterly summary of Hemphill's work."2
After pointing out the origins of rights in various systems of laws
in Texas, Roberts said of Hemphill :8
".. . To consistently harmonize them required the calm, deliberate
judgment, the extensive research, and the studious habits which characterized his whole life while on the bench....
"As in other new countries, the statutes enacted in Texas were often
76 Dallas Herald, Feb. 13, 1861, p. 2, col. 3; The
Standard (Clarksville, Texas),
Feb. 23, 1861, p. 2, col. 4; Sandbo, First Session of the Secession Convention of Texas,
18 SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL QuARTERLY 162, 194 (1914).
77 Dallas Herald, Aug. 7, 1861, p. 1, col. 8.
78 Dallas Herald, Nov. 27, 1861, p. 1, col. 4; King, The PoliticalCareer of Willanson
Simpson Oldham, 33 SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL QUARTERLY 112, 121 (1929).
9 Texas State Gazette (Austin, Texas), Jan. 18, 1862, p. 2, col. 2; Dallas Herald,
Jan. 22, 1862, p. 1, col. 2.

80 LUBBOCK, SIx DECADES IN TEXAs 378 (1900).

81 Preface, 28 Tex. vi.
82 Preface, 59 Tex. vii.viii.
88 Id. at viii.
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crude in structure, and the acquisition of rights under the laws was
attended with many irregularities. These things required extensive and
accurate knowledge of the habits and pursuits of the people of Texas
through a long series of years, combined with a politic conservatism
on the part of the court of last resort, to prevent the continual unsettling of rights long deemed secure. This marks the course of the chief
justice, generally sustained by a majority of the court. The favorite
subjects selected for his own investigations were those arising under
the institutions and laws of Spain and Mexico, for which he was well
qualified by his knowledge of the Spanish language; under the laws
relating to marital rights, to marriage and divorce; to homestead rights,
and to other exemptions from executions. With most of these subjects
the lawyers of the state were least familiar and authorities upon them
were not generally accessible."
Of Hemphill personally he said:"4
"He was one of the few judges that have been on the supreme bench
who gave very especial attention to the literary excellence of his written
opinions. In consequence of this, and on account of the great care and
deliberation given to his subjects, he did not deliver as many opinions
as either of his associates, he not having delivered more than about
five hundred in the eighteen years during which he was chief justice,
from 1841 to 1858.
"He presided in court with a rather austere dignity, and gave to those
addressing the court a respectful and silent attention, rarely ever asking
a question of the counsel in the case being presented. When he spoke at
all on the bench, his words were few and his manner positive.
"In his intercourse with the members of the bar he preserved a reserved
dignity, that, though hardly repulsive, did not invite familiarity; yet he
was a man of kindly and friendly disposition generally, with remarkable uniformity in his manners and general bearing.
".. . His presence always commanded the respect due to his exalted
position as chief justice."
From these contemporary estimates of Hemphill, as well as
from his opinions, we can only draw the conclusion that he was
truly a great judge. Texas was most fortunate in having him at the
84

Ibid.
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head of the court in the critical early days; his work furnishes
an illustrious example which his successors may well strive to
emulate.

